task with readiness to forget the sanguinary wrongs. The future fate of
the Agreement we have reached will depend equally on the goodwill of the
" God sees into our hearts. He sees their absolute sincerity . . . And so,
inter alia, the Polish Government could not further hesitate to accept this
responsibility, one of historical significance, of signing the agreement with
the Soviet Union."
Sikorski had underlined the integrity of the Polish State and the
inviolability of its frontiers. But following its usual procedure, Russian
diplomacy, having once signed the treaty, immediately began to seek for
the weak spots in which to drive the thin edge of the wedge. On August
3rd, Izvestia replied sarcastically to Sikorski—in order to impress on him
the fact that he had not understood the real meaning of the Agreement, or at
least not in the way the Kremlin wanted to interpret it.
Izvestia wrote :—
" The tremendous historic importance of the Soviet-Polish Agreement
naturally explains the great public interest and vivid response which is
evoked throughout the world. We are obliged to mention the fact, however,
that, in their analysis and appraisal of the Agreement, people sometimes
make historical references and attempt to draw historical parallels which are
by no means correct. As an example of such parallels we can cite the
broadcast of the Polish Prime Minister, General Sikorski, on July 31, in
" In his speech he drew a parallel between the year 1795, when * two
great powers, Germany and Russia, vowed that Poland and the Polish name
were to disappear for ever/ and the year 1939 when' a similar agreement for
the annihilation of Poland for ever * was concluded.
" The events of 1795 were the direct result of co-operation between
Europe's then most reactionary states, which had united to fight against
revolution and movements of national liberation.
" This also means that there is not, and cannot be, any similarity between
1795 and 1939. The entry of the Soviet troops into Eastern Poland in
1939, took place in conditions when, as Molotov noted in his speech on
September 17, 1939, Poland had become a convenient field for all sorts of
unexpected events which might create a menace to U.S.S.R.
" In the Soviet-Polish Agreement of July 30, 1941, the Soviet Govern-
ment has recognised that the Soviet-German Agreement of 1939 concerning
territorial changes in Poland has lost its validity. By this is emphasised that
* territorial changes ' are not eternal and that frontiers established by such
* changes ' are not immutable. For instance, we do not consider immutable
the Polish-Soviet frontier established by the Treaty of Riga in 1921, nor
do we share the view that * no one dares to presume that the borders of the
Polish State of 1939 may be questioned/ as expressed by Sikorski in his
This answer left no room for any further doubts on the matter. The
Soviets had signed an agreement with Poland because of the existing
situation on their battle-front, but at the same time they were careful to
leave themselves a margin, should victory be achieved, for their avowed
intention of fixing the frontiers in accordance with their own wishes.
Was this Agreement with Poland, Danaos' gift from the Kremlin's over-
lord during a period of mortal fear ? Had the wine of concord and
friendship been tendered in a poisoned amphora ?